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Railway systems have evolved considerably in the last years with the adoption of new communication technologies. Aiming
to achieve a single European railway network, the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) emerged in Europe to
substitute multiple and noninteroperable national railway communication systems. This system and its security strategies were
designed in late 1990s. Recent works have identified vulnerabilities related to integrity, authenticity, availability, and confidentiality.
In the context of defining effective countermeasures to mitigate potential vulnerabilities, these vulnerabilities have to be analysed.
In this article we introduce a framework that attempts to challenge ERTMS security by evaluating the exploitability of these
vulnerabilities.
1. Introduction
The increased needs of transportation in a common market
and the lack of interoperability between different railway
operational styles in Europe brought up the need for a
common rail management system in Europe. In the mid-
1980s, the railway community began to search for a com-
mon European operation management for railways, called
European Rail TrafficManagement System (ERTMS) [1].This
solution was created to substitute the heterogeneous national
train control landscape scenario.
The ERTMS communications are radio based communi-
cations and, thus, wireless systems are used to transmit the
movement authorities from the Radio Block Centre (RBC),
the entity in charge of managing trains operation, to the
trains. Up to now, the wireless communication technology
in use is the GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Railways), a
specific version of GSM devoted to railway communications.
In order to guarantee the security of the communications,
the GSM-R network has to ensure several security properties.
On the one hand, the data transmitted should be kept
confidential. Moreover, the data should not be changed by
an attacker before arriving to the train, to ensure that the
train does not receive fake movement authorities. On the
other hand, the communication network should be always
available for the exchange of needed messages. That is, the
network has to ensure the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability, which is a widely known model designed to
guide information security policies within an organization
and represents the most crucial security properties. Since
safety is one of the most critical issues to be addressed in
the railway context, in this work we focus on train movement
authorization message exchanges, so our primary concern is
data integrity, even if availability and confidentiality will also
be affected.
With the goal of guaranteeing data confidentiality and
integrity, different encryption systems are used in the differ-
ent communication layers. For GSM and also for GSM-R,
A5/1 encryption system is used. In addition, the EuroRadio
protocol is used to ensure the authenticity and the integrity of
the communications. However, it has been proved that both
protocols have vulnerabilities [2, 3].
Finally, it should be taken into account that radio
jamming devices could jam, block, or interference wireless
communications, being able to break the availability of the
network.
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Apart from the aforementioned lack of security of GSM-
R and EuroRadio, it is necessary to point out the evolution
of the railway communications in the last years. Although
in recent past railway systems were close systems, recently,
a new trend of connecting all the elements of the railway
network to the Internet is getting relevance.This fact results in
exposing railway communications to intrinsic vulnerabilities
of Internet and, thus, challenging the security in these
scenarios.
Due to the easiness of not fulfilling the security properties
defined in the CIA triad, the railway context can be consid-
ered a hostile environment and, hence, safety and security are
demanded in these networks.
Many efforts have been done to provide safety in the
railway scenario [4–6], but security is an emerging demand,
and even if different research efforts have also been done
for providing secure railway communications [7, 8], there
are still several limitations. Moreover, methodologies used in
safety analysis, based on probabilistic hazards, are not valid
for it. That is, it is not feasible to calculate when an attacker
will detect a vulnerability and/or exploit it. Therefore, it is
necessary to design a vulnerability detection system, in order
to try to avoid the exploitation of those vulnerabilities by
means of defining countermeasures.
Our contribution focuses on presenting a framework
that will be able to exploit the vulnerabilities of the ERTMS
system regarding integrity and authenticity. By means of this
framework, it will be possible to know if this attack can be
done in real time or not.
The article is organized as follows; in Section 2, we
describe the ERTMS protocol and analyse why the railway
context is a hostile environment. In Section 3, we analyse the
work done relating to this topic. We describe our framework
in Section 4, emphasising the benefits of having a framework
that attacks different vulnerabilities, describing it, with the
limitations that it has, and finally describing the process we
will follow to know if the described attack could succeed in
real time; then we conclude in Section 5.
2. Overview of ERTMS
The ERTMS is composed of two elements: (1) the European
Train Control System (ETCS) for the signalling and (2) the
GSM-R for the communication.
2.1. ETCS. TheETCShas a great variety of possible configura-
tions in the signalling equipment used on the existing or new
lines. Because of this, ETCS has been conceived with several
application levels: 0, NTC (national train control), which is
the former STM (specific transmission module), 1, 2, and 3.
Next, the different ETCS levels are described.
2.1.1. ETCS Level 0. ETCS level 0 covers the operation of
ETCS equipped trains on lines that are not equipped with
ETCS or national systems. On this lines, lineside signals are
used to givemovement authorities to the trains.This level has
been defined to ensure the proper transition between ETCS
equipped and nonequipped trains.The operation of this level
is shown in Figure 1.
2.1.2. ETCS Level NTC. ETCS level NTC is used to run
ETCS equipped trains on lines equipped with national train
control and speed supervision systems. The train control
information that is generated trackside by the national train
control system is transmitted to the train via the communi-
cation channels of the underlying national system and trans-
formed onboard into information interpretable by ETCS.
Depending on the functionality and the configuration of the
specific national system installed onboard, the ERTMS/ETCS
onboard system may need to be interfaced to it, in order to
perform the transitions from/to the national system and/or in
order to give access to ERTMS/ETCS onboard resources.This
can be achieved through a device called STM. The operation
in this level is presented in Figure 2.
2.1.3. ETCS Level 1. In the application ETCS level 1, ETCS
is overlaid to the traditional signalling equipment. The train
position is detected by the traditional trackside devices,
which are linked to the interlocking through the inter-
face Lineside Encoder Unit (LEU). The interlocking is the
wayside equipment control. Lineside signals are kept, and
data is transmitted to the onboard equipment by means
of Eurobalises, which are transponders placed between the
rails of the railways. The operation of this level is shown in
Figure 3.
2.1.4. ETCS Level 2. In application level 2, GSM-R radio
is used to exchange data between the RBC and the trains.
EuroRadio protocol is implemented in these communication
channels, which is based on a 3DES cryptographic system.
Movement authorities to the trains are sent via this channel,
and besides a continuous speed supervision is made. For this
communication, the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) of the
Control Centre communicates with the onboard unit (OBU)
of the onboard equipment.
However, the train detection is performed by the track-
side equipment, so it is out of the scope of ERTMS/ETCS. In
this level, lineside signals could be suppressed.The operation
is described in Figure 4.
2.1.5. ETCS Level 3. Finally, the operation level 3 is a radio
based train control system. Movement authorities are gener-
ated trackside and transmitted to the train via EuroRadio, as
in level 2, but in this level, train position is also performed
by the trackside RBC. Eurobalises are just used for location
referencing. Lineside signals could be suppressed in this level
too. The operation is described in Figure 5.
2.2. GSM-R. During the course of their standardization
activities, the UNISIG group realized that in order to ensure
security of the railways in GSM, certain spectrum bands
needed to be allocated. However, GSM could not fulfil all
the requirements needed for an efficient railway service, and
therefore, some specific functional features were added to the
GSM specifications.
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The frequencies allocated in Europe for GSM-R are
close to the GSM 900 band of the public operators. A
4MHz spectrum with 19 frequencies is available for these
communications.
In order to guarantee the confidentiality of the network,
the A5/1 stream cipher is used in GSM (and GSM-R)
networks. A stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where
plain-text digits are combined with a key stream.
2.3. Integrity and Authenticity in ERTMS. From the second
level ETCS, integrity and authenticity in ERTMS are accom-
plished with two different security mechanisms: A5/1 for
GSM-R and EuroRadio for ETCS. This is the target level of
our framework.
Regarding A5/1, even if at the beginning the encryption
system was kept in secret, it became public knowledge
through leaks and reverse engineering [2]. A number of
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serious weaknesses in the cipher were identified [10]. Hence,
rainbow tables able to decrypt encrypted messages are avail-
able on the Internet.
On the other hand, the EuroRadio protocol uses 3DES
keys to encrypt the messages [11]. The keys used in the com-
munications (KTRANS, K-KMC, KMAC, and KSMAC) are
created by the KMC entity, with the exception of the session
key, KSMAC. The KTRANS and K-KMC keys are transport
keys used to ensure the safe distribution of the KMAC keys
from the KMC to ERTMS entities. This distribution is made
off-line; this means it requires personnel to manually deliver
the messages.
The KMAC key is used in the session establishment
process to negotiate the KSMAC session key between ERTMS
entities. Three messages are exchanged between the ERTMS
entities in this phase for the authentication of both entities
and the key generation. In thesemessages,𝑅
𝐴
and𝑅
𝐵
random
numbers are sent, which are used for computing the KSMAC
key together with the KMAC key. Considering KSMAC =
𝐾
𝑆
= 𝐾
𝑆1
, 𝐾
𝑆2
, 𝐾
𝑆3
, the three 64-bit DES keys 𝐾
𝑆1
, 𝐾
𝑆2
, and
𝐾
𝑆3
are calculated according to the following formulas:
𝐾
𝑆1
= MAC (𝑅
𝐴
𝐿 | 𝑅
𝐵
𝐿, 𝐾
𝐴𝐵
)
= DES (𝐾
3,DES
−1 (𝐾2,DES (𝐾1, 𝑅𝐴
𝐿 | 𝑅𝐵
𝐿)))
𝐾
𝑆2
= MAC (𝑅
𝐴
𝑅 | 𝑅
𝐵
𝑅, 𝐾
𝐴𝐵
)
= DES (𝐾
3,DES
−1 (𝐾2,DES (𝐾1, 𝑅𝐴
𝑅 | 𝑅𝐵
𝑅)))
𝐾
𝑆3
= MAC (𝑅
𝐴
𝐿 | 𝑅
𝐵
𝐿, 𝐾󸀠
𝐴𝐵
)
= DES (𝐾
1
,DES−1 (𝐾
2
,DES (𝐾
3
, 𝑅
𝐴
𝐿 | 𝑅
𝐵
𝐿))) .
(1)
where 𝐿 means left and 𝑅 means right, and therefore, 𝑅
𝐴
=
𝑅
𝐴
𝐿 | 𝑅
𝐴
𝑅 and 𝑅
𝐵
= 𝑅
𝐵
𝐿 | 𝑅
𝐵
𝑅.
The calling entity (𝐵) creates a 𝑅
𝐵
random number and
sends it to the called entity (𝐴) in plain text. Consequently,
the 𝐴 entity creates a 𝑅
𝐴
random number and computes the
KSMAC key with both random numbers and the KMAC.
Afterwards, the 𝐴 entity sends the created 𝑅
𝐴
random
number and a CBC-MAC code computed with the KSMAC
and both random numbers to the 𝐵 entity. Finally, the 𝐵
entity computes the KSMAC key and verifies that it is correct,
creating also a CBC-MAC with it, which is sent to the 𝐴
entity, for the complete authentication. Random numbers are
exchanged in plain text and, thus, an attacker could save
them.
3. Related Work
A lot of research and innovation projects are being completed
with the funds of the European Union regarding the cyber-
security in railways. Some of those projects are described in
[12].
Different analyses of the ERTMS protocol’s security have
also been done. These analyses have pointed out vulner-
abilities that the ERTMS cryptographic mechanisms have.
A high-level security analysis of ERTMS is made in [13]
but does not present the vulnerabilities of the EuroRadio
protocol that will be exploited with this framework. Different
vulnerabilities of the EuroRadio protocol are pointed out
in [3] by performing an analysis of it with the ProVerif
tool. These vulnerabilities include, for instance, the ability
of including high-priority messages or deletion of messages,
since the session establishment process does not use time-
stamps and, therefore, these messages could be replicated. In
this case, once the session is established, the train does not
verify the identity of the RBC anymore, so a vulnerability that
could be exploited exists.
Additionally, [14] pointed out that since the distribu-
tion of the KMAC key is made off-line and this requires
personnel to manually deliver the keys from the KMC to
the ERTMS entities, many operators decide to simplify the
process by using the same KMAC for large train fleets,
amplifying the risk of having an attack. Therefore, if the
attack is performed during the session establishment process
and the same key is shared between different parties, the
whole system could be compromised: an attacker could
take the identity of many trains in other session establish-
ments.
On the other hand, [15] pointed out the ability ofmaking a
key collision attack to DES and [16] described how a Related-
Key Attack (RKA) can be done in ERTMS. A method for
doing these two attacks in ERTMS networks is presented in
[17] and concludes that the EuroRadio protocol is not secure
if large amounts of data and, therefore, long session lengths
are used. Thus, the Meet-in-the-Middle attack presented in
this article could be more feasible.
However, all of these analyses present vulnerabilities of
the protocols used in ERTMS but do not describe how
these vulnerabilities could be exploited in order to later find
countermeasures for those vulnerabilities. This paper will
contribute by presenting a framework that describes how an
attack could be performed and figuring out if it is feasible to
do it in real time.
4. Proposed Method for
Vulnerability Detection
In this section, we present our framework and themethod for
vulnerability detection describing also its limitations. Finally,
the process we will follow to know if an attack could be
successful in real time is described.
4.1. Description of the Framework and Limitations. The sce-
nario that this framework will consider is shown in Figure 6.
The train is used to connect to the Control Centre in order
to receive movement authorities, but first, the train sends a
position report to the Control Centre.
In the scenario that we are considering, we force the train
to connect to the malicious Control Centre, instead of the
real one, but before doing this, we calculate the keys used in
the communication between the train and the RBC, with the
attacker presented in Figure 7.
Once we have gotten the keys and forced the train to
connect to our malicious Control Centre, the position report
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that the train sends will arrive to the malicious Control Cen-
tre. This position report is encrypted by different encryption
systems in different levels, but in this point, we have already
obtained the keys used in the communication and, therefore,
we are able to decrypt the message. Accordingly, we are able
to change the position report and send it to the real Control
Centre, by taking the identity of the train.TheControl Centre
receives the fake message and creates a movement authority
depending on the position report, which is sent to the train.
The framework we have considered is described in Fig-
ure 7. It is composed of the malicious Control Centre, the
train, an attacker that will eavesdrop, and the real Control
Centre.
Themalicious Control Centre is formed by the false RBC,
which will be an industrial PC; the OpenBTS (Open Base
Transceiver Station) software [18], which is composed of the
SIPAuthServe, SMQueue, and Asterix servers; and the USRP
N210 Software Defined Radio (SDR) [19].
The OpenBTS is a software-based GSM access point,
allowing standard GSM-compatible mobile phones to be
used as SIP endpoints in Voice over IP (VoIP) networks.
The software controls the transceiver, makes calls, and sends
SMSs. The SIPAuthServe is the server that processes SIP
register requests that OpenBTS generates when a handset
attempts to join the GSM network. It supports three types of
authentication:
(i) AUTH type 2: unauthenticated. The handset is con-
nected to the OpenBTS network but it does not exist
in the register server.
(ii) AUTH type 1: cached authentication. The handset is
connected to the network and it does exist in the
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register server, but a simple encryptionmethod based
on TMSI is used.
(iii) AUTH type 0: full authentication. The SIM card is
full authenticated in OpenBTS and, therefore, 𝐾
𝑖 key
is provided to the authentication server and used
for the encryption. The 𝐾𝑖 is a 128-bit value used
to authenticate the SIMs on a GSM mobile network.
Each SIM holds a unique and secret Ki assigned by
the operator.This authentication method uses proper
GSM encryption over the network.
The other servers in OpenBTS are SMQueue and Aster-
isk, as it has been pointed out before. While the SMQueue
processes SIP message requests that OpenBTS generates
when a handset sends an SMS, Asterisk is a VoIP switch
responsible for handling SIP INVITE requests, establishing
the individual logs of the call, and connecting them together
[20].
The hardware part of the OpenBTS software is a SDR,
USRP N210 in our case, with two GSM antennas to create
the network. USRPN210 has been chosen because it supports
GSM-R networks and provides high-bandwidth and a high-
dynamic range processing capability.
The train in the framework will be simulated with a PC,
a Modem, and a programmable SIM card. A programmable
SIM card [21] is needed because it is necessary to know the𝐾𝑖
key of the SIM card in order to get the full authentication in
OpenBTS and use a GSM encryption over the network. The
Modem will be used for being able to connect the PC to the
GSM network.
Finally, the attacker that will perform the eavesdropping
attack in Figure 7 will be supplied by a TDT-SDR. It is a SDR
that captures the traffic in the GSM network together with
the Universal Radio Hacker (URH) software. With this SDR
we will be able to investigate the wireless protocol, and with
the rainbow tables we will be able to get the A5/1 keys used
in the communication between the train and the real Control
Centre. Thus, since the SIM card we use has a programmable
𝐾
𝑖
, we will be able to configure the same A5/1 key and,
therefore, once we force the train to connect to the malicious
Control Centre, we will be able to decrypt the sent messages.
As mentioned before, our framework is composed of
OpenBTS and USRP N210 and, therefore, since we use the
OpenBTS software, we are able just to create GSM-R and
GPRS networks. In the case railway networks evolve to LTE
(Long Term Evolution) network, we could use OpenLTE
open source project [22], but this project cannot be used in
the hardware USRP N210 because of clock incompatibility
reasons. Therefore, a sample rate conversion on the host
would have to be done in the USRP.
4.2. Specification of the Procedure. The flow chart that this
attack follows is described in Figure 8. As can be seen, after
installing the framework we are able to get the data from
the train to the real Control Centre. This traffic is ciphered
by A5/1. Since we have the rainbow tables in the attacker
performing the eavesdropping attack, we are able to decrypt
the messages on GSM level.
The attack in the EuroRadio protocol will be performed
against the DES KSMAC key and will be a Meet-in-the-
Middle attack. In this attack, all possible keys are tested.
Since all the messages that are exchanged between the
train and the RBC in ERTMS are defined in [11], we assume
that we are able to obtain a known plain-text and a cipher-text
pair (𝑃1, 𝐶1). The Meet-in-the-Middle (MTM) attack with in
ciphers like 𝐶 = DES(𝐾1,DES(𝐾2, 𝑃)) works as follows:
We build a list containing the pair (𝐼1, 𝐾1) for every
possible value of𝐾
1
, 256 for DES. The 𝐼
1
values will be gotten
by brute force, 𝐼
1
= DES(𝐾
1
, 𝑃
1
).
On the other hand, we will obtain 𝐼
2
values by performing
𝐼
2
= DES−1(𝐾
2
, 𝐶
1
). This operation is performed until the 𝐼
2
value matches a 𝐼
1
value that is stored in the table.
In order to be sure that the computed keys are correct, it
is possible to obtain another known plain-text and a cipher-
text pair (𝑃
1
, 𝐶
1
) and calculate 𝐶 = DES(𝐾
1
,DES(𝐾
2
, 𝑃
2
)). If
C and𝐶
2
are equal, it means the we have find the correct keys.
In triple-DES systemswhere there are three different keys,
the ciphers work following the next relation:
𝐶 = DES (𝐾1,DES
−1 (𝐾
2
,DES (𝐾
3
, 𝑃))) . (2)
For the Meet-in-the-Middle attack in triple-DES
with three different keys, we define DES(𝐾
2
, 𝑃) =
DES−1(𝐾2,DES(𝐾3, 𝑃)), so we just need to apply this
for the calculation of 𝐼1.
The calculation of 𝐼1 needs 2112 operations, because it
is a double-application of DES, and on the other hand,
the calculation of 𝐼2 needs 256 operations. Thus, the attack
requires 2112 + 256 ≈ 2112 operations.
Afterwards, if we are able to calculate the three keys we
are going to obtain𝐾
𝑆
= (𝐾
𝑆1
, 𝐾
𝑆2
, 𝐾
𝑆3
), we need to calculate
the time we need for performing the whole attack, as Figure 8
describes. With the measured time, we know whether this
attack could be performed in real time or not.
In the case the attack can be performed in real time, that
is, if all the keys are obtained during the operation of the train,
these keys could be used to carry out different attacks that
involve the identity theft of the train or the RBC.The attacker,
for instance, could pass himself off as the RBC in order to
send false movement authorities to the train. On the other
hand, the attacker could also falsify the trains position control
that is made by the RBC in ERTMS level 3, by sending false
position information to the RBC while he impersonates the
train. All this false information created by the attacker could
involve the collision between different trains.
The results obtainedwith the frameworkwill help in look-
ing for countermeasures, since the fact of acquiring the keys
in real time means A5/1 and 3DES security mechanisms are
not strong enough for railway environments. In consequence,
those mechanisms should be enforced or changed in order
to continue using ERTMS systems in a secure manner. A
possible countermeasure for the system could be to update
the 3DES security mechanism to a more secure system such
as AES, since AES uses larger block sizes and longer keys.
Therefore, it will be more costly to perform the attack in real
time. In fact, 3DES keys length is 112 or 156 bits, whereas
in AES, the length of the keys is variable: 128, 192, or 256
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bits. However, the use of AES should be first evaluated by the
framework presented in Figure 7.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Different vulnerabilities in the security mechanisms of the
ERTMS system have been described in this article, but even
if they are identified, without an attacking framework we do
not know whether they are exploitable in practice or not. In
consequence, the presented framework will give information
about the exploitability of the A5/1 and 3DES security mech-
anisms and, therefore, will determine if countermeasures
should be applied to improve the security of the system or
not. Moreover, the resulting information of the framework
will constitute the basis of the countermeasures that should
be applied to the system.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.
Acknowledgments
This research work was supported by the Spanish Gov-
ernment through the SAREMSIG TEC2013-47012-C2-1-R
project, Proyectos de I+D+I Retos Investigacio´n 2013, and
by the Cyber Security on Rails project with Construcciones
Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles, Investigacio´n y Desarrollo, S.L.
2015-2016.
References
[1] U. P. Winter, Compendium on ERTMS, Eurail press, 2009.
[2] M. Kalenderi, D. Pnevmatikatos, I. Papaefstathiou, and C.
Manifavas, “Breaking the GSM A5/1 cryptography algorithm
with rainbow tables and high-end FPGAs,” in Proceedings of the
22nd International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and
Applications, FPL 2012, pp. 747–753, nor, August 2012.
[3] R. J. T. Joeri de Ruiter andT. Chothia, “A formal security analysis
of ertms train to trackside protocols,” Reliability, Safety, and
Security of Railway Systems - Modelling, Analysis, Verification,
and Certification, pp. 53–68, 2016.
[4] UIC, “2005, UIC Code 518 OR: Testing and approval of railway
vehicles from the point of view of their dynamic behaviour:
safety, track fatigue, ride quality”.
[5] A. Faivre, A. Lapitre, A. Lanusse et al., “Two methods for
modeling and verification of safety properties of railway infras-
tructures,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Industrial Engineering and Systems Management, IEEE IESM
2015, pp. 48–54, esp, October 2015.
[6] M. Franekova´, K. Ra´stocn, A. Janota, and P. Chrtiansky, “Safety
analysis of cryptography mechanisms used in gsm for railway,”
Annals of the Faculty of Engineering Hunedoara, vol. 9, no. 1, p.
207, 2011.
[7] L. J. Valdivia, I. Adin, S. Arrizabalaga, J. Anorga, and J.
Mendizabal, “Cybersecurity-The Forgotten Issue in Railways:
Security Can Be Woven into Safety Designs,” IEEE Vehicular
Technology Magazine, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 48–55, 2018.
[8] G. Hatzivasilis, I. Papaefstathiou, and C. Manifavas, “Real-time
management of railway CPS secure administration of IoT and
CPS infrastructure,” in Proceedings of the 6th Mediterranean
Conference on Embedded Computing, MECO 2017, mne, June
2017.
[9] U. SUBSET-026-2, “Ertms/etcs system requirements specifica-
tion chapter 2 basic system description,” Tech. Rep., 2014.
[10] C. Manifavas, G. Hatzivasilis, K. Fysarakis, and Y. Papaefs-
tathiou, “A survey of lightweight stream ciphers for embedded
systems,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 10,
pp. 1226–1246, 2016.
[11] U. SUBSET-037, Ertms/etcs euroradio fis , tech. rep,.
[12] E´. Masson and C. Gransart, “Cyber Security for Railways –
A Huge Challenge – Shift2Rail Perspective,” in Proceedings of
the Communication Technologies for Vehicles: 12th International
Workshop, Nets4Cars/Nets4Trains/Nets4Aircraft ’17, pp. 97–104,
Toulouse, France.
[13] R. B. I. Gashi, R. Bloomflied, and R. Stroud, “How secure is
ertms?, Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security: SAFECOMP
2012Workshops,” in Proceedings of the SAFECOMP 2012 Work-
shops: Sassur, ASCoMS, DESEC4LCCI, ERCIM/EWICS, IWDE,
pp. 247–258, Magdeburg, Germany, 2012.
[14] I. Lopez and M. Aguado, “Cyber security analysis of the Euro-
pean train control system,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 110–116, 2015.
[15] E. Biham, “How to forge des-encrypted messages in 228 steps,”
Tech. Rep., Technion Computer Science Department, 1996.
[16] F. Pe´pin and M. G. Vigliotti, “Risk assessment of the 3des in
ERTMS,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in
Bioinformatics): Preface, vol. 9707, pp. 79–92, 2016.
[17] T. Chothia, M. Ordean, J. De Ruiter, and R. J. Thomas, “An
Attack against message authentication in the ERTMS train
to trackside communication protocols,” in Proceedings of the
2017 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, ASIA CCS 2017, pp. 743–756, are, April 2017.
[18] R. Networks, “Openbts,” 2018, http://openbts.org.
[19] E. Research, “Usrp n210,” 2018, http://www.ettus.com/product/
details/UN210-KIT.
[20] Digium, “Asterisk,” http://www.asterisk.org/.
[21] Sysmocom, “sysmousim-sjs1 sim card,” 2018, http://www.sys-
mocom.de/products/sysmousim-sjs1-sim-usim.
[22] “Openlte,” 2018, http://sourceforge.net/p/openlte/wiki/Installing.
International Journal of
Aerospace
Engineering
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Robotics
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
 Active and Passive  
Electronic Components
VLSI Design
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Shock and Vibration
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Civil Engineering
Advances in
Acoustics and Vibration
Advances in
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Electrical and Computer 
Engineering
Journal of
Advances in
OptoElectronics
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com
Volume 2018
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2013www.hindawi.com
The Scientific 
World Journal
8
Control Science
and Engineering
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com
 Journal ofEngineering
Volume 2018
Sensors
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
International Journal of
Rotating
Machinery
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Modelling &
Simulation
in Engineering
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Chemical Engineering
International Journal of  Antennas and
Propagation
International Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Navigation and 
 Observation
International Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
 Advances in 
Multimedia
Submit your manuscripts at
www.hindawi.com
